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Russian vaccines: ‘the first in the world’ 
The second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic build-
ing up in most countries has increased the pressure 
on governments and research institutes to develop 
an effective vaccine against SARS-CoV-2 as quickly 
as possible. In Russia, the second wave of the pan-
demic started in September 2020. Over the next 
month the number of infected individuals tripled, 
and by the end of October more than 17,000 cas-
es were being diagnosed daily. At that time, the 
number of deaths doubled and reached nearly 
300 daily (a total of nearly 25,000 Russians have 
died of COVID-19). In order to curb the spread of 
the disease, the government has launched meas-
ures to restore restrictions for selected groups of 
citizens (mainly seniors), although for the time 
being these restrictions have not been introduced 
on a large scale.
Moreover, laboratories have joined the fight 
against the virus. On 11 August 2020, President 
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During the second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, Moscow has stepped up its activities in the global 
‘vaccine race’ against SARS-CoV-2. So far Russia has registered two vaccines, which was announced 
by President Vladimir Putin himself. The presentation of Sputnik V, which the Russian government 
has branded as the ‘world’s first vaccine’, caused controversy from the very start, for both medical 
(as the clinical trial procedure was not completed) and ethical reasons (forcing ‘volunteers’ to take 
part in the tests). Foreign specialists, alongside the Russian medical community and the Russian public, 
have expressed scepticism about the insufficiently tested preparation. Despite this, the government is 
planning to carry out a mass campaign of public vaccination using Sputnik V and export this vaccine, 
mainly to developing countries.
Since the start of the pandemic, Moscow has viewed the vaccine’s registration as an important 
instrument of its foreign policy and of Russia’s soft power which will illustrate its ambition and de-
termination to win the ‘vaccine race’ with the West. Alongside the element of prestige, the launch 
of the vaccine is also of major financial significance due to the high profits expected from its sale. 
For the global economy, the vaccine’s launch is an opportunity to reduce the losses triggered by 
the pandemic. Russia is mainly focusing on emerging markets, although Sputnik V will face strong 
competition there from Chinese-made vaccines.
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Putin announced that Russia was the first country 
to have registered a vaccine against SARS-CoV-2. 
It was developed by the Gamaleya National Centre 
of Epidemiology and Microbiology, which is su-
pervised by the Ministry of Health, in cooperation 
with the Central Scientific Research Institute of 
the Russian Ministry of Defence. The preparation, 
referred to as Gam-COVID-Vac and given the trade 
name Sputnik V, is a vector-based vaccine in which 
a vector virus delivers the genetic instructions for 
SARS-CoV-2 antigens directly into patients’ cells, 
instructs them to make SARS-CoV-2 protein, and 
stimulates an immune response. The body then 
produces antibodies in response to the replication 
of these proteins.1 At the time of registration, 
the vaccine had only completed two phases of 
clinical trials. The 38 participants in both trials 
were volunteer subjects aged 18–60 (this was 
not a placebo-controlled trial). In addition, the 
vaccine is being introduced into general circulation 
on only a temporary basis (until 1 January 2021). 
At present, phase III of the clinical trial is ongoing; 
it is expected to cover 40,000 volunteers aged 
18 and older. Once it is finished, the preparation 
should obtain full registration in December 2020.
At present, around fifteen other vaccines are at 
a similar stage of development worldwide. Up 
to eight of them have been approved to take 
part in a phase-III clinical trial before the Rus-
sian vaccine: five vaccines developed by Western 
pharmaceutical companies and three by Chinese 
ones. For comparison, the European company 
AstraZeneca, in collaboration with the University 
of Oxford, carried out the vaccine’s phase-I and -II 
clinical trials with the participation of nearly 1100 
subjects, whereas the Chinese company CanSino 
Biologics included more than 700 subjects in 
1 For more details on the vaccine see sputnikvaccine.com/
about-vaccine.
its phase-I and -II trials.2 Due to the fast spread 
of the pandemic, all pharmaceutical companies 
have reduced the duration of these two phases 
to around six months (instead of the usual two 
to four years).
Although the testing process has not yet been 
completed, public distribution of Sputnik V was 
launched in Russia as early as 8 September. Before 
obtaining full registration, the preparation will 
probably be made available to representatives 
of high-risk professions (including medical staff 
and teachers), and a mass vaccination campaign 
is to be launched next year.
Sputnik V is one of several vaccines against 
SARS-CoV-2 currently being developed in Rus-
sia. On 14 October 2020, the EpiVacCorona was 
registered (like Sputnik V) ahead of its phase III 
clinical trial. EpiVacCorona was developed by the 
Vector laboratory based in Novosibirsk, which 
is supervised by the Russian Federal Service for 
Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and 
Human Wellbeing (Rospotrebnadzor). Back in the 
Soviet era, Vector was involved in research on 
biological weapons under the cover of a civilian 
scientific and technical institute.3 EpiVacCorona 
is a synthetic peptide-base vaccine; it does not 
cause the virus to replicate within the human body, 
which makes it a safer option for immunocom-
promised people. This vaccine is to be marketed 
domestically as of 1 January 2021. Both the Russian 
vaccines were developed in record time because 
they were based on a body of research which the 
two institutes had previously carried out, mainly 
concerning a vaccine against Ebola.
Although other research institutions are working 
on similar preparations, these two laboratories 
had in fact been privileged as they enjoyed fi-
nancial and political support from various groups 
in the Russian elite. At the same time, they were 
engaged in fierce competition; they hindered 
2 A. Rivas, P. Loftus, A. Cervantes, ‘Covid-19 Vaccines: What’s 
Coming and When?’, The Wall Street Journal, 25 September 
2020, www.wsj.com.
3 Д. Туровский, «Другого способа лечения нет и сейчас», 
Meduza, 31 October 2014, www.meduza.io.
Sputnik V has come under criticism 
from scientific communities over its 
unfinished testing process, the very 
small number of subjects involved in 
the clinical trials, and numerous ir-
regularities in the results presented.
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each other’s research by blocking access to the 
information regarding patients they had access 
to. This competition reflected the rivalry between 
their ‘patrons’. The two vaccines also competed in 
terms of their advertising campaign: Sputnik V was 
promoted by representatives of the Russian elites 
linked to the defence ministry and the Kremlin: 
defence minister Sergei Shoigu, Moscow’s mayor 
Sergei Sobianin and President Putin’s daughter 
reported they had been vaccinated with Sputnik, 
while EpiVacCorona was promoted by the head 
of Rospotrebnadzor Anna Popova and deputy 
prime minister Tatyana Golikova, who said they 
had taken this vaccine.
Sputnik V: medical and ethical 
dilemmas
From the beginning, the process of testing and 
marketing the vaccine sparked numerous doubts 
and major medical and ethical controversies. Fol-
lowing President Putin’s announcement regarding 
Sputnik V’s registration and the publication by 
the vaccine’s developers in the Lancet, repre-
sentatives of medical and scientific communities 
(mainly foreign) expressed their criticism regarding 
the research methodology used and the results 
obtained by the vaccine’s development team. 
They highlighted numerous information gaps, 
the very small group of subjects in the clinical 
trials, the statistical irregularities in the results 
presented, and the insufficient analysis of possi-
ble side-effects. Their doubts were not dispelled 
by the subsequent explanations submitted by 
the preparation’s creators,4 and Sputnik V has 
frequently been referred to in the Western press 
as an “under-tested vaccine”.5 In addition, its 
credibility has been undermined by the dubious 
reputation of Russian laboratories and by doubts 
regarding their previous achievements (the Ebola 
vaccines they developed have not been put into 
general use).
4 ‘Российские разработчики вакцины против коронавируса 
наконец-то подробно ответили на критику западных 
ученых. Разбираем, чьи аргументы убедительнее’, Me-
duza, 23 September 2020, www.meduza.io.
5 J. Twigg, ‘Vladimir Putin Has a Vaccine, and He’s Rushing 
to Share It’, The New York Times, 13 October 2020, www.
nytimes.com.
Many controversies as regards the ethical aspect 
of the vaccine’s development have also emerged; 
for example, employees of public institutions who 
were subordinate to the vaccine’s developers were 
pressurised to take part in the trials of Sputnik V. 
The vaccine was administered to employees of 
institutions supervised by the health ministry (in-
cluding the Gamaleya Centre which developed the 
vaccine; its employees were given Sputnik V when 
it was still at its pre-clinical stage), the defence 
ministry, the Moscow healthcare department and 
some municipal companies. In some instances, the 
‘volunteers’ forced to take part in this procedure 
complained that the tests performed ahead of 
their inoculation showed that their body had al-
ready produced antibodies to SARS-CoV-2, which 
disqualified them from participating in the study.6 
In some cases, their employers promised to pay 
them gratuities for taking part,7 while others 
threatened to strip them of their bonuses or even 
to dismiss them.8
Distrust of Sputnik V has also been expressed by 
the Russian medical community, who will be first 
in line for the vaccination programme (the govern-
ment claims that participation in this programme 
will be voluntary). In a poll conducted in August 
2020,9 a mere 24% of physicians said that they 
would be willing to have themselves vaccinated 
6 See ‘Спецкор «Медузы» Светлана Рейтер стала доброволь-
цем на испытаниях вакцины от коронавируса «Спутник 
V». Мы попросили ее записывать свои ощущения — день 
за днем’, Meduza, 29 September 2020, www.meduza.io.
7 For taking part in the study the volunteers received a re-
muneration of US$1500 and were offered an insurance 
policy enabling them to receive US$4000 in case of health 
complications and US$26,000 in case of their death.
8 Е. Фохт, ’«Некоторые первый раз слышат, куда пришли». 
Кто и зачем испытывает на себе российскую вакцину 
от коронавируса’, BBC News Pусская cлужба, 6 October 
2020, www.bbc.com/russian.
9 The poll was conducted on a sample of 3040 individuals via 
a popular application used by medical professionals known 
as ‘Doctor’s Guide’, used by around half of all physicians 
in Russia (580,000 individuals). For more, see ‘Прививка 
от COVID-19: аргументы медиков за и против скорой 
вакцинации’, BusinessFM, 14 August 2020, www.bfm.ru.
President Putin personally announc-
ed the registration of Sputnik V which 
in Russia is referred to as ‘the first in 
the world’.
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with Sputnik, whereas 52% were apprehensive 
about taking an under-tested, hastily developed 
vaccine. This scepticism about the preparation is 
shared by the Russian public, which has always 
been distrustful of Russian-made pharmaceuticals 
and preferred Western-made ones. A poll con-
ducted in September by the pro-Kremlin United 
Russia party showed that 73% of respondents 
did not intend to have themselves vaccinated 
with Sputnik.10 A poll conducted by the Levada 
Centre back in August 2020 revealed that 54% of 
the individuals surveyed did not intend to take 
Sputnik V.11 The vaccine was found to evoke mainly 
negative feelings in the respondents, including 
‘distrust’ and ‘doubts’ (both were indicated by 
20% of those questioned).
The Russian vaccine: cui bono?
In Russia, the fight against the coronavirus is 
mainly being financed from public funds. Anton 
Siluanov, Russia’s finance minister, has estimated 
that the total extra budgetary spending on health 
care and sanitary & epidemiological activities in 
2020 stands at more than US$2.5 billion. It is 
difficult to estimate how much has been spent 
on vaccine development because each phase of 
the research has been financed separately. In ad-
dition, alongside direct subsidies from the state 
budget, the laboratories receive support from 
other public institutions, in particular the Russian 
Direct Investment Fund (RDIF). Pharmaceutical 
companies are also investing in the mass pro-
duction process. However, estimates show that 
Russian spending on vaccine research (around 
US$100 million) was much lower than the amounts 
spent by Russia’s foreign competitors. The largest 
sum (more than US$10 billion) has been spent by 
the government of the United States to this end; 
it includes US$1.2 billion invested in research 
carried out by the pharmaceutical company As-
traZeneca in collaboration with the University of 
10 The survey was conducted in party offices on a sample 
of 20,000 individuals. See ‘Более 70% россиян не хотят 
делать прививку от коронавируса, показал опрос’, РИА 
Новости, 5 October 2020, www.ria.ru.
11 ‘Hовость о создании вакцины от коронавируса у 46% 
россиян вызвала негативные эмоции’, Левада-Центр, 
28 August 2020, www.levada.ru.
Oxford (in exchange Washington has pledged to 
buy around 300 million doses of the vaccine if its 
efficacy is confirmed).
In Russia, the biggest support from the state 
budget was offered to two state-controlled lab-
oratories: in 2020 the Gamaleya Centre received 
a subsidy worth around US$25 million,12 while the 
Vector Centre received a sum of around US$20 mil-
lion.13 The RDIF14 has become the principal investor 
in preparations for the mass production of Sput-
nik V and its promotion abroad; it has earmarked 
around US$50 million for that purpose. According 
to government announcements, 800,000 doses of 
the vaccine are to be manufactured in November, 
around 1.5 million in December, and in spring 
2021 the production volume is to reach around 
15 million doses monthly. Initially, manufacturing 
will be carried out by three Russian pharmaceutical 
companies with which the RDIF has signed the 
relevant contracts. These companies are a private-
ly-owned company, R-Farm (which has also signed 
an agreement with AstraZeneca to produce the 
British coronavirus vaccine); Binnofarm, which is 
a component of the Alium pharmaceutical hold-
ing (it is owned by the state-controlled VTB bank, 
the privately-owned AFK Sistema company, and 
foreign investors linked to the RDIF); and the pri-
vately-owned company Biocad, which is both the 
Vector Centre’s partner in developing the vaccine 
and its planned manufacturer. For comparison, 
12 Н. Телегина, ‘Первая российская вакцина от коронавиру-
са обошлась федеральному бюджету в 1,8 млрд рублей’, 
Открытые медиа, 26 August 2020, www.openmedia.io.
13 А. Стогней, К. Аренина, ‘«Обогнать весь мир полити-
ческой волей и решительностью». Как Россия делает 
вакцину от коронавируса’, The Bell, 16 June 2020, www.
thebell.io.
14 A state-controlled investment fund, established in 2011, 
which invests in Russian companies in partnership with 
foreign businesses. It manages capital worth US$10 billion 
and is an important instrument of Russia’s international 
economic cooperation; for example, it holds a stake in 
several pharmaceutical companies.
Sputnik V has come under criticism 
from scientific communities over its 
unfinished testing process, the very 
small number of subjects involved in 
the clinical trials, and numerous ir-
regularities in the results presented.
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Russian companies produce around 50 million 
doses of flu vaccine annually.
The Gamaleya Centre has also received support 
from Sberbank, Russia’s biggest bank. This bank 
established the Immunotekhnologii company to 
provide organisational, technological and manu-
facturing support for the production of Sputnik V 
(the sum of US$40 million will be invested in these 
activities). Moscow’s municipal authorities have 
joined the financing of phase III of the clinical 
trials. The investors can be practically certain of 
a return on their investment: the Kremlin is plan-
ning to have around 70 million citizens (50% of 
Russia’s population) vaccinated, which will mainly 
be financed from the state budget. Each dose of 
Sputnik V is expected to cost around US$10.
It should be noted that the main beneficiaries of 
these state expenditures, both on fighting the 
pandemic in Russia and developing the vaccines 
against SARS-CoV-2, are state-controlled insti-
tutions and companies which have close ties to 
the ruling elite. The Rostekh state corporation, 
managed by President Putin’s confidant Sergei 
Chemezov, brings together companies operating 
mainly in the defence sector, and it has become 
the main supplier of ventilators, protective suits 
and thermometers, as well as flu vaccines (it holds 
a 70% share in this market15). Deliveries of coro-
navirus tests under public procurement (so far, 
more than 50 million tests, mainly Russian-made, 
have been performed) have largely been provid-
ed by private businesses with links to the ruling 
elite, including Deputy Prime Minister Golikova 
and President Putin’s crony Arkady Rotenberg.16
Moreover, the government is using the fight 
against the coronavirus to strengthen state capital-
ism. This involves relying on public institutions and 
increasing the involvement of the defence sector 
(e.g. Rostekh) in meeting the growing demand for 
15 ‘Как госмонополия «Нацимбио» заработала на вакцинах 
и кто от этого выиграл’, Transparency International Russia, 
16 October 2017, www.transparency.org.ru.
16 М. Плюснина,  ‘Брат чиновника из АП, бизнесмен 
из окружения Голиковой и вездесущие Ротенберги’, Znak, 
27 April 2020, www.znak.com.
medical equipment and pharmaceuticals. How-
ever, and most importantly, the Kremlin’s focus 
on self-sufficiency and its reliance on domestic 
production (even if it is unable to fully replace 
imported goods) is strengthening the process of 
import substitution in the pharmaceutical and the 
medical equipment sector, which has been ongo-
ing since 2009. Until recently, it was progressing 
at a rather slow pace: in 2019 the share of Rus-
sian-made drugs on the Russian pharmaceutical 
market in terms of value was only just over 30% 
(compared to 25% in 2014), and the share of 
Russian-made equipment on the medical equip-
ment and materials market was a mere 23%.17
Vaccine diplomacy: Sputnik V as 
an instrument of Russia’s soft power
Russia sees the current pandemic as another 
chapter of its rivalry with the West, as well as 
an opportunity to strengthen its position on the 
international stage. It has incorporated the issues 
related to the fight against COVID-19, includ-
ing developing the vaccine against SARS-CoV-2, 
into its set of diplomatic tools. Moscow has also 
made it a point of honour to make sure it regis-
ters a vaccine first. The Kremlin has consistently 
referred to Sputnik V as the world’s first corona-
virus vaccine, even though the testing process is 
still unfinished (several foreign-made vaccines 
are at a more advanced stage of clinical trials). 
Sputnik V’s registration was accompanied by 
a high-profile propaganda campaign involving 
President Putin himself. Russian media and poli-
ticians compared this event to the launch of the 
first satellite, Sputnik 1 (hence the name of the 
vaccine), back in 1957 and stressed that once 
again Russia has outpaced the United States.18 
The fight against the pandemic, in particular Rus-
sia’s ‘coronavirus philanthropy’, has become an 
17 А. Левинский, ‘Время дженериков: к чему привело им-
портозамещение в медицине и фармацевтике’, Forbes, 
8 September 2020, www.forbes.ru.
18 In an interview for CNN, the RDIF’s director Kirill Dmi-
triev said: “It’s a Sputnik moment. Americans were sur-
prised when they heard Sputnik’s beeping. It’s the same 
with this vaccine. Russia will have got there first”. See 
M. Chance, ‘Russia says foreign inquiries about its potential 
fast-track Covid-19 vaccine are pouring in. But questions 
abound’, CNN, 30 July 2020, www.edition.cnn.com.
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important instrument of its soft power. As part 
of its humanitarian aid, the Kremlin has provided 
one million SARS-CoV-2 tests, mainly to the CIS 
countries; dispatched military medical personnel 
to Italy; and sent medical equipment including 
ventilators to the US. During his recent address to 
the UN General Assembly, President Putin offered 
to make the vaccine available to employees of the 
United Nations free of charge.
Participation in the global ‘vaccine rivalry’ is associ-
ated not only with prestige, but most importantly 
with tangible profits. The RDIF has estimated the 
initial demand for the vaccine at 3–5 billion doses, 
worth around US$75 billion. The Fund is hoping 
that Russia will be able to supply around 1 billion 
doses by the end of 2021. Alongside the domestic 
market and the CIS region, the Russian govern-
ment is mainly promoting Sputnik V in developing 
countries, especially those highly affected by the 
pandemic. Moscow is concentrating on bilateral 
agreements, which could enable it to tighten its 
relationships with these countries and to sell them 
the potential vaccine at an attractive price. This 
is why the Kremlin has decided not to join the 
multilateral solidarity initiative known as COVAX, 
promoted by the WHO and numerous non-gov-
ernmental organisations (it has been joined by 
more than 170 states, although the US decided 
to opt out). The goal of COVAX is to raise funds 
to finance the purchase of at least 2 billion doses 
of a COVID-19 vaccine by the end of 2021 and 
to distribute them equally to all countries in the 
world, particularly the poorest ones which cannot 
afford to buy them out of their own budgets.
The RDIF is conducting talks with at least 20 states, 
and has already reached an agreement with sev-
eral of them regarding the vaccine’s clinical trials 
and supply. The first batches of the vaccine to be 
tested in phase-III trials have now been delivered 
to Belarus. Other countries expecting to receive 
batches of Sputnik V include Uzbekistan (35 million 
doses in total) and Kazakhstan (2 million doses). 
The Fund has also announced agreements with 
Mexico (32 million doses in total), India (100 mil-
lion doses), Egypt (25 million doses), Brazil’s State 
of Bahia (50 million doses) and Nepal (25 million 
doses).19 It has also launched talks with Saudi 
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran and the 
Philippines. The export of Sputnik V will be possi-
ble once its safety and efficacy are proven and it 
has been approved for sale in the target countries. 
It should be noted that Russia will mainly be com-
peting for emerging markets with China. In an at-
tempt to attract customers, Moscow has declared 
that in order to increase the vaccine’s availability 
it is ready to share its technology and use the 
support from the RDIF to launch the vaccine’s 
production abroad, including in India, Brazil and 
South Korea. What makes Sputnik V less attractive 
is the fact that, like the majority of vaccines at 
the most advanced testing stage, it requires the 
administration of two doses (at a three-week inter-
val), whereas the vaccine produced by the Chinese 
company CanSino Biologics can be administered 
in a single dose (this variant is preferred by the 
WHO). It will also be difficult to sell Sputnik V in 
the West due to the distrust of the Russian prepa-
ration and the strong competition on the part of 
multinational pharmaceutical companies. Devel-
oped countries are already signing agreements 
for the delivery of potential SARS-CoV-2 vaccines 
with reputable Western companies.
19 ‘РФПИ договорился о поставках 25 млн доз вакцины 
«Спутник V» в Непал’, ТАСС, 29 September 2020, www.
tass.ru.
The research into the Russian vac-
cine is being jointly funded by nu-
merous public institutions, and the 
costs borne by Russia have proved 
much lower than the expenditures 
incurred by its foreign competitors.
